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Introduction 
 
As Maurice Roche has pointed out, Olympic Games (like football World Cups) are 
'mega-events'. As 'large scale cultural events which have a dramatic character, mass 
popular appeal, and international significance', they offer unique public relations 
opportunities for the host nation.1 Munich '72 was West Germany's first high-profile 
chance to self-represent itself on home soil to audiences abroad since National 
Socialism.2 While the Games required the backing of the national government, 
perhaps surprisingly the involvement of German politicians in determining the shape 
of what amounted to a wide-ranging good-will campaign for the Federal Republic 
was minimal. Nevertheless, almost all facets of the 1972 Games were informed by 
the organizers' intention to correct and refine negative perceptions of the country 
abroad.3 This applied not least to the PR campaigns advertising the Games from 
1968 onwards which are the focus of this article. In this as in all other aspects of 
Munich '72, the organizers were informed by what Johannes Paulmann has called an 
'attitude of restraint' (Haltung der Zurückhaltung) in cultural diplomacy. After the 
ignominy of two world wars this approach avoided any hint of boastful triumphalism 
based on economic might and reconstituted political power, but aimed instead at 
rebuilding trust and furthering mutual understanding in the international arena. 
Conceived during the Adenauer era as a means of reintegration into the international 
community, it was a strategy the Munich Games continued to follow.4  
From conception to completion, Munich '72 was largely the brainchild of Willi 
Daume, a man whose career as West Germany's leading sport functionary was 
made in the 1950s and 1960s.5 Daume first saw his chance with the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1965; quickly convinced Munich's mayor Hans-Jochen 
Vogel to put his city forward; helped secure government funding; and as president of 
the 1972 Organizing Committee (OC) worked tirelessly to make the Games a 
success. Daume was an idealist who saw participation in sports as a universal 
human entitlement and this entailed helping the nations in the 'developing world' to 
participate in high-performance sports events including the Olympics. As he stated in 
a well-publicized speech delivered in Nigeria in 1970, the Munich Olympics were 
intended to be 'characterized by respect for all races and men'.6 This meant that 
special care was expended on advertisement in Africa.  
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However, given West Germany's integration into the Western system of political, 
economic, and military alliances, it was even more important to use the Munich 
Olympics to advertise the country to its former enemies and current allies and 
partners in Europe and across the Atlantic. Beyond the symbolic importance of 
strengthening ties by playing host to the Western world, promoting the Games and 
the country in these parts of the world also served eminently practical purposes, 
such as strengthening the domestic tourism industry and ensuring that the Olympic 
venues would be filled with visitors.   
At the same time, given the spirit of restraint on the one hand and the lavish 
expenditure on the architecture of the Games on the other – exemplified in the 
famous tent-shaped Munich stadium roof which in itself came to symbolize and 
advertise the openness and transparency of West German democracy – little was 
left for PR and advertisement in the narrow sense. To be precise, Otto Haas, 
formerly the director of Munich's tourist office and in charge of a dozen full-time 
employees from January 1968, had only DM 10 million at his disposal. This was the 
equivalent of half-a-percent of the entire Olympic budget of c. DM 2 billion.7 
Paulmann states that an important side-effect of cultural diplomacy is that the 
image projected to foreign audiences also influenced how Germans saw themselves 
and the state in which they lived. Since the 1950s it set in motion a process of 
learning what it meant to be German and contributed markedly to the formation of 
identities through 'an interplay of self-perceptions'. In other words, Germans 
increasingly saw themselves through the prism of how they and their country were 
represented abroad.8 However, as the Munich organizers had to find out, there was 
no direct correlation between the good will for the 1972 Games created abroad and 
the West German public's support of the event. While the overall attitude of the 
population had been largely positive, when Munich won the bid, over the years that 
supportive attitude waned. Some of this was due to the fact that the primary PR 
focus was laid on audiences abroad, with relatively belated attention paid to the 
German public. More importantly, however, with the exception of a marked dip in the 
immediate run-up to the Games, the German public's attitude roughly followed a 
logic which has also been observed for other host cities and countries of Olympic 
Games: from expectation to criticism, to agreement and euphoria. 
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Mexico City 1968 
 
Advertising the nation abroad was not always easy. One episode illustrates the 
problem perfectly. According to IOC regulations (Art. 54) the Munich organizers were 
allowed to advertise the Games internationally only after the preceding Olympics had 
ended, so not to endanger their success. As opposed to its other activities, this 
meant that the OC could only begin its foreign PR after the end of the Mexico-City 
Olympics which took place as late as October 1968 for climatic reasons. The 
Mexicans insisted on this point and went so far as to largely prevent advertisement 
for Munich during their Games or, at least, 'seriously hindered' it, as the Munich OC 
would emphasize quite undiplomatically in its official report after the Munich Games.9   
Not that the Mexicans were uncooperative without good reason. 'Winning friends 
for the Federal Republic' abroad, the overarching aim of Munich's PR,10 had already 
gone badly wrong before the campaign had even got off the ground. The Mexicans, 
the first country in the 'Third World' to host Olympic Games, were certainly insecure. 
This was not only because of the much debated issue of hosting the Games at high 
altitude issue but more importantly due to the way they were portrayed abroad. The 
Western press customarily depicted Mexicans as an apathetic, lazy, and backward 
people. Along with their doubts over what effects altitude would have on athletic 
performances, many foreign commentators warned of chaotic and badly-organized 
Games, which the country moreover could barely afford. An article in Der Spiegel in 
early 1968, for example, which was widely reported in the Mexican papers, ridiculed 
the American-Indian heritage of the country's population and questioned its ability to 
stage the Games let alone win any medals.11 
While the Mexico Games went on to become a pinnacle of self-representation not 
just for the Mexican nation-state but for Latin America as a whole and arguably the 
entire 'Third World'12, this was not clear in the run-up when international doubts 
dominated. In such a climate the Mexicans created problems for the Germans 
wherever they could. For instance, they insisted that whatever PR measures the 
Munich delegation had planned, including, most importantly, a press conference, 
would have to wait until after the Closing Ceremony when journalists from all over 
the world were on the way to the airport or had already departed. Despite 
protestations with the IOC in Lausanne, the Munich organizers had no choice but to 
comply with the Mexicans' wishes.13 With the exception of an exhibit and the 
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customary reception in Mexico City's Plaza Hotel, where members of the IOC, the 
local OC and the international sporting federations were wined and dined, all other 
measures had to be postponed or cancelled.14 It was clear that the Mexicans 
certainly did not want to be outdone at their own Olympics by the hosts of the next 
Games in the 'First World'.  
Moreover, there had been trouble before. During a visit to the Munich OC in late 
1967 the president of the Mexican OC, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, was extremely 
irritated to find that federal coins, which helped finance the Munich Games, as well 
as commemorative coins minted by private businesses were already in circulation. 
While the Munich organizers had restricted the sale of federal coins to the domestic 
market for the time being, for legal reasons they could not prevent private mints from 
selling their goods abroad. Moreover, these companies' offers included gold coins 
commemorating both the Munich Games and those in Mexico City. Fearing the 
negative effect on his own OC's revenues, Ramírez Vázquez was not only personally 
affronted but faced a serious economic problem. Daume tried to save the situation 
by arranging for German banks simultaneously to distribute the official Mexican 
coinage free of charge but the Mexicans' national pride made it impossible to accept 
the offer. Even IOC President Avery Brundage's intervention on Daume's behalf did 
not help.15 Furthermore, Ramírez Vázquez's requests to the Munich OC and the 
Foreign Office for technical and financial aid to assist in the making of the Mexico-
City Olympic film fell on deaf ears, and during his visit with the Munich OC he felt 
looked down upon. A report from the German Embassy in Mexico City to the Foreign 
Office rightly predicted 'that it would be more difficult in future to count on [Ramírez 
Vázquez'] understanding for [West German] requests at the 1968 Olympic Games in 
Mexico City'.16 
Africa 
 
In the grand scheme of things, however, the West Germans' low reputation among 
the organizers of the Mexico Games mattered little since overall Germany and the 
Germans enjoyed a rather positive image in Latin America.17 Moreover, pragmatic 
reasons stood in the way of making greater efforts there. While the general PR and 
advertisement concept, as formulated in January 1969, stated that the 'ambition [of 
the organizers] should be to attract as many visitors as possible from as many 
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countries as possible to Munich and Germany'18, in reality it was clear from the 
outset that the relatively small budget was best spent in a focused fashion. This 
meant in effect that Latin American countries along with other poorer regions of the 
world, which were unlikely to send many visitors, would receive limited PR attention, 
relatively late in the run-up to the event. 
Africa, however, was an exception. Even if, as Haas stressed in an internal 
position paper, the Munich organizers could not expect many visitors from that 
continent either, the 'young continent' could not be ignored since much had been 
made of its participation of Africans during the application phase.  In addition to 
'humane', 'serene' (heiter), 'spatially compact', and 'green' Games that aimed at a 
Coubertinian synthesis of culture and sport, the Munich bid had promised that the 
1972 Olympics would be Games for the newly decolonized nations.19 Moreover, 
while it could be safely assumed that most Latin American IOC votes had gone to 
Munich's closest competitor Madrid in 1966, Daume, when pressed by the Foreign 
Office, 'was strongly convinced that all Africans […] from North to South without any 
exception whatsoever' had supported the Bavarian capital. With success, Daume 
noted, came 'responsibilities, the fulfillment of which would be of eminent political 
value for the Federal Republic'20 – not least because in the age of decolonization, 
Africa had rapidly become a theater of superpower struggle over ideological 
allegiances and the new economic world order. In view of its growing fiscal strength, 
the Federal Republic was called upon to 'accept greater responsibilities and an 
increased share of the burden for securing the future of the Western alliance […] and 
the development of the Third World'.21 The realm of sport was no exception.  Haas 
therefore echoed Daume's views when he noted that the Munich organizers had a 
'certain political and sports obligation to keep the African population well-informed' 
about the Games.22  
Accordingly, DM 1 million of extra funds donated by the record label Ariola were 
made available to enhance Germany's image in Africa alone. African views of 
Germany were considered problematic in that they were very much characterized by 
the opposite of what Munich aimed to project. As a legacy of recent history and 
German colonialism, the predominant image was that of the 'masculine' 'soldier, 
brave both in attack and defence, loyal and adept at using his weapons'. 'Self-
restraint, unconditional obedience, and preference of honour ahead of other criteria, 
[were] other traits of this image.' 'Bismarck and Hitler seem[ed] to be the incarnation 
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of the German', at least for the Arabic part of the population in North Africa, Haas 
noted.  Moreover, all over Africa, Germans were seen as 'un-rhythmical' in distinction 
to the 'sensitive' French.23 This view was to be countered by a PR campaign which 
portrayed the Germans as 'peaceful, conciliatory, serene, sensitive, sober, accurate 
and seeking harmony'.24  
The Munich organizers' charm offensive was to be supported by intensifying the 
customary activities of federal agencies and ministries involved in foreign cultural 
diplomacy and development aid in the realm of sports. The Federal Press Office, for 
instance, organized seminars for African sports journalists, while the Foreign Office 
and the Ministry of Interior worked hand in hand in sending sports equipment and 
West German coaches to African countries and providing scholarships for African 
athletes to study at the Deutsche Sporthochschule in Cologne. In line with this, sport 
development aid for 'Third World' countries increased steadily as a part of foreign 
cultural policy in the run-up to Munich. The total expenditure of DM 685,000 in 1966 
rose to nearly DM 1.2 million in 1970 and, including DM 500,000 for the preparation 
of athletes for the Munich Games alone, 1.8 million DM in 1971. Originally 2.43 
million DM and 2.95 million DM had been earmarked for 1971 and 1972, though 
these figures were later reduced as part of general cuts in the 1971 federal budget.25  
Of course, compared to West Germany’s official development aid, which was 
distributed by the Ministry of Economics and ran into the hundreds of millions per 
year (e.g. DM 600 million in 1965)26, these were small sums. But developing 
countries sympathetic to the Federal Republic could, of course, hope to receive from 
the bigger pot as well. 
Moreover, Daume made it a priority to undertake good-will tours to Africa to 
advertise the Games and deliver invitations to African NOCs. Judging from reports 
received from German embassies, the Foreign Office certainly thought these trips 
were a full success, not just as advertisement for the Games but more generally in 
PR terms for the Federal Republic. 'In African countries in particular [those 
responsible for sports] considered it a great honour to have the invitations delivered 
personally', one official noted.27  
On these occasions, Daume stressed the importance of African participation, in 
terms of team-size rather than visitor cohort. However, neither Daume nor his African 
audience were naive. Economic and social conditions made it difficult to stage 
Games of 'equal opportunity' and Daume came with a bag of presents to distribute in 
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the spirit of 'Olympic comradeship'. African participation was largely made possible 
with generous financial aid from the Federal Republic. When he went to Lagos in 
December 1970, the gifts not only included DM 1 million in travel assistance to 
regional Olympic teams but also a track for West-African sprinters made of Rekortan, 
the same material used in Munich's Olympic stadium.28  
Even if African athletes were not all yet able to compete at the highest level, 
Daume correctly pointed out that this 'young continent' owned the future in sporting 
terms. Moreover, the Africans' presence was more than welcome not least because 
of their 'ability to join in festive celebrations' (Fähigkeit, sich festlicher Fröhlichkeit 
hinzugeben). Daume meant it sincerely, when he emphasized somewhat 
condescendingly that the Africans with their 'talents for rhythm, music, and dance' 
were the ideal antidote to nationalistic pathos and the political abuse of the Olympic 
idea.29 As events related to the expulsion of Rhodesia on the eve of the Munich 
Games were to show two years later, this was wishful thinking. With the Rhodesian 
team already having arrived in Germany, the Organization of African Unity used the 
threat of a last-minute mass boycott of the Games by African states to assert its 
stance against white-minority rule in the former British colony and successfully 
forced the IOC into withdrawing its invitation to the Rhodesian athletes to participate.  
At the time, however, Daume's message seems to have been well-received in 
West Africa, if the press is anything to go by. The Nigerian monthly magazine The 
People, for example, ran a positive 13-page article. By providing a colourful image of 
the Games, its editor stressed the great lengths to which the Munich hosts had gone 
to leave a lasting impression on their future guests.30 
The 'First World'  
 
The majority of visitors from outside Germany were expected not from Africa and the 
developing world but from North America and Western Europe. While one of the 
organizers' aims was to ensure there would be no empty seats in the Olympic 
venues, they also wanted to use the Games' potential to increase tourist revenues as 
a whole, by encouraging foreign visitors to come not just for the Olympics but to 
spend some time in other parts of Bavaria and Germany. There was also a 
pragmatic reason for this, as Munich itself could not supply sufficient hotel beds for 
visitors.31 Beyond these functional reasons, the Games were meant to 'refine 
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[aufarbeiten] or, if that should be necessary, correct the image of the Federal 
Republic'.32  
In determining the target groups for their campaigns abroad, the Munich 
advertisers relied on historical, statistical, and demoscopic information. The 1960 
Rome Olympics, Munich's geographically and temporally closest point of reference, 
showed that 53 percent of all Olympic visitors came from four countries: 18 percent 
from the US and Canada, 12 percent from Germany and France each, and 11 
percent from the United Kingdom. North Americans had also been the largest visitor 
group to Tokyo and Mexico City, while the national tourism figures for the 1960s 
suggested that the same was true for Bavaria and Munich. For example, of the 1.2 
million foreigners staying in Munich overnight in 1967, c. 321,000 came from the US 
(the rest from Italy, Austria, France, Switzerland, and the UK).33 These figures 
suggested that while the number of foreigners attracted to Munich was already quite 
high, North America and Western Europe represented the most promising growth 
areas for the Bavarian tourism industry as a whole. This was confirmed by an 
Infratest poll conducted among 1,100 tourists visiting Munich between August and 
September 1969, which showed that of 100 potential visitors to the Games 40 would 
come from the US, 22 from Italy, 15 from France, 9 from the UK, and 8 from the 
Netherlands.34 
US tourists proved particularly interesting to the Munich campaign, as they 
possessed the largest disposable income and were, accordingly, the biggest 
spenders. At the same time, experience showed that the length of stay and income 
stood in inverse proportion, the former falling as the latter rose. Moreover, Americans 
traditionally displayed little interest in Bavaria outside Munich and primarily passed 
through the Federal Republic in transit to other destinations. In order to lengthen 
North American sojourns, women were to be particularly addressed by 
advertisement, 'as Munich and Bavaria possessed a wealth of offers for the holidays 
also for women less interested in sports (important for couples!)'.35  
Most importantly, it seemed paramount to change perceptions of Germany 
across the Atlantic. In essence, the image of the Federal Republic had to be made 
'more colourful' (farbiger) in order to counter the 'quasi neutral' manner in which the 
country was customarily seen. US citizens in particular respected West Germany's 
technological and economic achievements after the war but they did not love the 
country. At the same time, where negative or value-neutral components of 
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Germany's image existed, they were, according to the Infratest poll, very well 
compensated for by the extraordinarily positive image of Munich. This was true even 
though those questioned voiced some concerns about a lack of friendliness in some 
hotels and restaurants in the city.36  
For the PR department, the best way to correct the Federal Republic's image was 
thus to transfer the positive attributes associated with Munich ('metropolis with a 
heart') and the Olympics ('serene Games') to the country as a whole.37 Whether this 
was successful is impossible to judge. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that it 
may well have been. The author of a report about the OC's participation in the 
Steuben parade in New York, held annually in honour of the eponymous German-
born general in the American Revolutionary Wars, for example, claimed that less 
than a year before the Games 'he could not discover any reservations concerning 
the fact that the Games take place in the Federal Republic and specifically in 
Munich'. Even the editor-in-chief of the German-Jewish émigré daily Aufbau had 
assured him that his paper would do all it could to make these Games a success. If 
there were concerns in the US, these related to the availability of tickets in the three 
disciplines which Americans were most interested in, that is, basketball, swimming, 
and track-and-field, as well as access to accommodation close to the Olympic 
venues. Americans seemed to fear that if they were put up somewhere close to the 
Alps their hotels would be as far from Munich as New York was from the Rockies.38  
The strategic PR goal of associating the positive characteristics of Munich and 
the Games with the Federal Republic as a whole was also to become the guiding 
principle of advertisement in Western Europe, where it was even more important to 
change perceptions due to recent history. By stressing that the Games would be 
'serene', 'humane' and 'modest', it was thought possible to reduce the image of the 
'newly-rich, perfectionist and emotionally cold German' who, the advertisers probably 
rightly believed, dominated perceptions of the post-war Federal Republic west of the 
Rhine.39 Moreover, as the OC's press chief Hans ('Johnny') Klein pointed out, with 
attributes such as 'modern, without pathos [unpathetisch], with serene colours', 
audiences in Western Europe could not 'suspect [the country of] falling back into 
totalitarian intentions'.40 Nevertheless, rather than addressing those with larger 
disposable incomes, it was felt better in France and Britain to specifically target the 
younger generation, 'who [had] a more flexible and partly more positive attitude to 
the Federal Republic'. Here as well, women were to be addressed in particular, by 
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stressing that the sports events were accompanied by an extensive cultural 
programme.41 While French and other Western European audiences were meant to 
be seduced with ample references to culture and folklore, 'umpa music and 
Lederhosen' were to be downplayed in the UK to avoid reinforcing existing negative 
stereotypes.42  
Means and Message 
 
Technically, the Munich organizers relied on the standard PR and advertisement 
means of the late 1960s basing their approach on a variety of visual and audio-visual 
materials. Most importantly, these consisted of 4 series of advertisement posters, 8 
information brochures and magazines in up to 19 languages, 200 copies of a 
standardized exhibition model of the Olympic venues, which cost DM 60,000 DM 
each and in 1971 alone were shown in more than 20 international cities. In a 
symbolic confirmation of the success of détente, the architectural model also went to 
Moscow in 1972. Accompanied by 2,000 posters displayed all over the Soviet 
capital, it was shown in a joint exhibit of the Soviet and West German NOCs which 
was opened by Munich's mayor Vogel and his Moscow counterpart.43 Moreover, the 
Munich advertisers commissioned two short films, Munich, a City Prepares (1969) 
and Munich, a City Invites (1971), which took their cue from Munich, a City Applies, 
the film which had supported city's bid in Rome 1966.  
Despite the fact that the OC's limited financial finances meant that ads in foreign 
newspapers had to be foregone, the Munich campaign reached a large international 
audience.44 Munich, a City Prepares alone was seen by an estimated 40 million 
people in 110 countries including the Eastern bloc.45 Shortfalls in finances were at 
least partly compensated by access to the funding and infrastructure provided by 
national organisations already involved in foreign cultural diplomacy. InterNationes 
and the Federal Press Office, for instance, paid for around a third of the 500 copies 
of each of the films, and these were then shown by a variety of federal agencies 
abroad, including German trade missions, consulates, and embassies.46  
Public and private businesses in the tourism industry also played their part.  West 
Germany's state-owned carrier Lufthansa, for instance, became the 'official airline' 
for Munich 1972 in return for distributing PR materials and free flights for members of 
the OC's executive board and general secretariat.47 Likewise, the North German 
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Lloyd made two of its large passenger ships, the MS Bremen and MS Europe, 
available for Olympic publicity.48 Its Hamburg competitor Deutsche Atlantiklinie in 
turn provided two of its luxury vessels, the MS Hamburg and the MS Hanseatic, for 
the same purpose. The ships not only distributed PR materials during routine 
voyages and cruises but during 1970 also served as platforms for Olympic 
receptions in the harbours of New York, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Leningrad, Helsinki, 
and Stockholm. In New York in May 1970, the occasion was used to re-unite two 
sporting heroes of the past, Max Schmeling and Jesse Owens, who agreed to act as 
special ambassadors for Munich '72.49 These receptions received a great deal of 
positive attention in the local press. According to Haas, their effect 'in bringing 
sympathies to the Federal Republic, could not be measured in figures'.50  
As a cost-saving measure, the Munich advertisers also convinced 55 foreign 
airlines and tourism organizations to show the Olympic films, display the architectural 
models, and distribute the PR and advertisement materials without charge.51 These 
included carriers such as the Hungarian Malev and its Bulgarian and Czech 
equivalents, further evidence for improved relations with the Eastern bloc.52 Tellingly, 
Interflug, East Germany’s state-owned airline was not willing to advertise for Munich. 
Equally, despite the rapprochement between the two German states after Willy 
Brandt became Chancellor in October 1969, the GDR state railways were unique in 
the Eastern bloc in not permitting Munich posters in its stations.53 
But intra-German problems were not the only political issues the advertisers 
faced. Saudi Arabian Airlines, for instance, insisted that the word 'Israel' should not 
be mentioned in the materials, nor were there to be any references to beer and 
alcohol.54 Direct references to private enterprises and businesses in turn were 
forbidden by IOC regulations, a fact bemoaned by official Olympic sponsor Coca-
Cola. The company nevertheless showed copies of the Olympic films during group 
visits to its filling stations and on occasion of sports events which it sponsored.55  
While virtually all PR and advertisement emphasized the qualities of the host city, 
it had to fulfil the additional function of transferring the positive attributes the 
international public already associated with Munich to Bavaria and the Federal 
Republic as a whole. As the following short analysis demonstrates, one excellent 
example of this strategy was the main brochure In the Middle of this City (Mitten in 
dieser Stadt), which was published in 15 different languages with a print run of 1.5 
million copies.56 From its title, which reinforced the idea of spatially compact Games 
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('Spiele der kurzen Wege') and was accompanied by the sentence, 'The longest 
distance in Munich is that of the Marathon Run', the reader was led via colour 
photography and text from the Olympic building site, 'where [signalling openness, 
tolerance and cosmopolitanism] 15,000 workers from 23 countries', had created 'a 
new piece of Munich', to the architectural beauties of the city's historical centre. From 
there the focus moved to a range of positive attributes associated with Munich, as 
witnessed by the American writer Thomas Clayton Wolfe57, such as joy of life, youth, 
and beauty ('schöne Münchnerin'), relaxation (beer, Hofbräuhaus), going for a stroll, 
shopping and participation. This was followed by a detailed description of the cultural 
program of the 'grand celebration of 1972', based on the claim that Munich '72 was 
not just a sports event 'but also a festival of artists and the arts'. Then came a 
section on Bavaria, which was identified by its cuisine (Knödel, Weißwürste, 
Leberkäs, Schmankerln), folklore (Lederhosen, Bauernhöfe), and the beauty of its 
lakes, mountains and castles, and finally, via the link of Kiel as host of the sailing 
competitions, another one on the Federal Republic. In line with Munich and Bavaria, 
the nation-state was represented visually and verbally in terms of its modern 
technology (Volkswagen, Autobahn), past cultural achievements (Bach and 
Beethoven, Marx and Mendelssohn, Goethe and Gutenberg, Dürer and Diesel), 
selected landscapes (Black Forest, Rhineland), historical towns and cities 'full of joy 
of life', such as Heidelberg and Cologne, traditional food (Sauerkraut), wine, and 
Gemütlichkeit. In short, potential visitors were led to believe that Munich's 
atmosphere could be rediscovered wherever they went in Germany.  
The Domestic Audience 
 
Given the care and attention lavished on foreign audiences and the recognition that 
the Games were a unique opportunity for cultural diplomacy abroad, there was 
always the danger that a positive attitude at home would be taken for granted and 
the citizens and tax payers of the Federal Republic neglected by Olympic PR. And 
this is exactly what happened. Whatever PR measures were used at home, they 
were half-hearted. Moreover, they came with a delay compared to efforts abroad, as 
advertisement in the Federal Republic only seriously started in 1970, around 30 
months before the Games began. While a number of initiatives were embarked upon 
from this point onwards, central parts of the Olympic campaign such as the Olympic 
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lottery Glücksspirale (Spiral of Fortune), suffered from teething problems and more 
deep-seated issues. Moreover, the closer the Games came, the less funding was 
available for domestic PR and advertisement. In the end, even an extra DM 100,000 
subsidy to enable the continuation of last-minute efforts, such as low-budget 
presentations by volunteers combined with a showing of Munich – a City Invites all 
over Germany, was declined by the authorities.58 Tellingly, neither the Federal 
Government, nor its Bavarian equivalent, nor many individual communes for that 
matter were willing to pay for Olympic flags which would have advertised the Games 
at national border crossings and in municipalities across the country in 1972.59  
In general, Munich Olympic advertisement faced a domestic context which grew 
less enthusiastic about the mega-event as the years went on. With the exception of a 
marked dip in the year before the Games this followed a common logic described by 
Olympic sociologist Miquel de Moragas and others: from expectation (six to four 
years before), to mistrust and criticism in the local press (four to two years before), to 
agreement (one year before), to euphoria, local solidarity, and limited criticism (year 
of the Games).60 At the same time, a number of specific reasons contributed to the 
worsening mood. First, in addition to the lack of attention paid to domestic 
audiences, there was the explosion of cost for the Games from initial estimates of 
around DM 500 million to c. 2 billion. This caused the West German press to become 
increasingly critical if not outright hostile. The organizers could no longer count on 
the near unanimous unquestioning support of journalists who had welcomed the idea 
during the application stage. Secondly, the German public increasingly suffered from 
Olympic fatigue. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the host city itself. Thirdly, 
the preparations for the Games fell into a period of discontent and social unrest in 
the Federal Republic. '1968' probably reinforced some of the above trends.  
An EMNID poll in the summer of 1971 showed that German attitudes towards the 
Games were much less positive than the organizers had believed. While two thirds 
of the German population thought that the Games were 'a good thing' (eine gute 
Sache), a worryingly high 29 percent had no opinion on the issue whatsoever. 6 
percent in turn thought the money invested would have been better spent on other 
things, e.g. public housing.61 The mood five years earlier had certainly been better. 
When the population was asked about its opinion in May 1966, 80 percent welcomed 
the IOC's choice of Munich as host city (with 9 percent against and 11 voicing no 
opinion).62 Even if the grand picture still looked positive in 1971, the fact that 
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approval rates had decreased was a matter of concern for the organizers. 'In the first 
place, the personal identification with the Games, the joy about “our Games” is still 
missing', the Executive Board of the OC noted with consternation.63 At the same 
time, the organizers were well aware that the more emphasis they put on domestic 
advertisement, the more they would increase the 'desire of citizens to experience the 
Games in Munich directly'.64 This would then increase pressure on tickets and 
accommodation, both of which were in limited supply.   
Nowhere had the organizers a greater PR problem on their hands than in Munich 
itself. The 1971 poll showed that the mood in the host city over the previous years 
had become somewhat negative. While EMNID had not distinguished between 
respondents from the host city and the rest of the Federal Republic, some of the 
answers can be identified as coming from local citizens. When asked what 
respondents associated with the Games, there were references to local price 
inflation, the cost for local taxpayers, noise and other forms of pollution. One typical 
indictment of the preparations ran as follows: 'All the dirt we have had, I have it up to 
here' (All den Dreck, den wir gehabt haben, mir langt's).65 Tellingly, at this point the 
best the organizers felt they could hope to achieve in the host city was 'grumbling 
consent' (grantige Zustimmung).66 Despite intensified efforts at winning over the 
population, not least in Munich, during the last 12 months before the Games, public 
opinion did not improve. Rather the opposite occurred. A further EMNID poll on the 
eve of the Games found that the number of those against and abstaining increased 
to 7 and 30 percent respectively, while those who liked the idea dropped to 63 
percent.67   
Conclusion 
 
As the example of the domestic and international campaigns for the Munich Games 
show, for PR and advertisement to be successful, it is not only necessary for the 
means and message to be powerful, suggestive and targeted, but they need to be 
timed correctly. At the same time, obviously, no PR and advertisement effort by itself 
could guarantee the Munich Games a positive influence on attitudes and sentiments 
towards Germany and the Germans, either at home or abroad. The proof of what PR 
was able to achieve was in the proverbial pudding, i.e. the event itself. Here the 
outcome was mixed. Certainly, older views and perceptions of the host country were 
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refined both in Africa and in the US and in Western Europe but largely for the wrong 
reasons.  
   No doubt, Africans appreciated the largesse the Federal Republic extended 
towards the athletes from their continent. The Games therefore corrected and refined 
long-standing negative African views of Germany which had been based on the 
legacies of colonialism. Germans were arguably also no longer perceived as tough 
and soldierly. But this was because the terrorist attack and the negligence and 
incompetence of those in charge of security had changed their image for the worse. 
Traditional views of Teutonic efficiency and competence were replaced by 
impressions of German haplessness and ineptitude. 
The 'First World' reception of the terrorist attack and its aftermath was 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the New York Times exculpated the authorities: 'Since 
the attack on the Olympic Village was unprecedented, the West German government 
was unprepared and had to improvise as events unfolded. The terrorists had the 
advantage of surprise, and of the near-chaos that surprise produced.'68 On the 
other, the massacre dominated the US media for quite some time, with reports 
emphasizing the bungled German rescue attempt. 
Perhaps the most surprising result the Games produced in PR terms concerned 
the host country itself.  Asked a few days after the Games ended whether – 'all 
things told, i.e., the serene atmosphere until the terrorist attack and then the terrorist 
attack itself' – they could be considered a success, 80 percent of West Germans 
replied in the affirmative, taking the polls back to their highpoint of 1966. 78 percent 
supported the IOC’s decision to let the Games continue.69 Despite the much praised 
performance of the West German Olympic team (particularly over the last few days), 
these are strikingly counterintuitive figures – not least because of those who 
supported the Games in the previous poll, the highest proportion did so in the belief 
they would contribute to peace and understanding.70 However one wants to judge 
these figures, they do suggest caution with regards to Paulmann's claim that during 
the post-war era the Germans increasingly saw themselves through the prism of how 
they and their country were represented abroad.71 
The organizers of future mega-events in the Federal Republic certainly took note 
of the failure of 1972. While the terrorist attack perhaps had not turned the Games 
into an unmitigated PR disaster, the attempt to project an image of the country as a 
modern and well-organized, yet informal and easy-going society had certainly gone 
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wrong. In consequence, no attempt was made to exploit the 1974 FIFA World Cup in 
West Germany for the purposes of cultural diplomacy abroad. On the contrary, the 
organizers of the World Cup did not even shy away from contradicting the messages 
of 1972, for example, by adopting a security strategy that turned the image of a 
peaceful and conciliatory Germany on its head. The Süddeutsche Zeitung had good 
reasons for calling the World Cup a 'police-sports festival'72, as security in 1974 was 
very tight and based on deterrence through a large and visible presence of the 
forces of order. The Final in Munich on 7 July 1974 involved 1,200 policemen which 
made this event the most comprehensive security operation in the city to date. As 
one official explained at the time: 'The fancy-dress ball of the Olympics was useless.' 
(Der Maskenball bei Olympia brachte uns nichts ein.)73 
In effect, the shock of the terrorist attack went so deep that it took the Federal 
Republic more than thirty years from the 1972 Olympics before national elites again 
felt confident enough to use a sports mega-event to transport positive messages 
about the nation to audiences abroad. Similar to the 1972 PR messages but also 
showing that Germany had come a long way since then, the headline slogan of the 
PR campaigns on occasion of the 2006 World Cup was Die Welt zu Gast bei 
Freunden. Literally this means the 'The world (is) visiting friends' and was wrongly 
translated into English as 'A time to make friends'. Aiming to project an image of the 
host as open, tolerant, modern, caring, democratic and achievement-oriented both in 
football and economic terms, the 2006 slogan also included a notion that the 
international guests could feel safe and secure while visiting their friends in 
Germany.74   
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